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Abstract 
In a risk assessment process, insular methods of data collection and analysis may lead to an inaccurate risk assessment 
as stakeholders hold individual biases, conflicting interests and parochial approaches to certain risks. The article 
considered these issues and tested a consensual risk assessment approach that can overcome many of these issues. A 
staged risk assessment process was applied within an entertainment complex in the Security, and Food and Beverage 
Departments. Eight supervisors from the two departments participated in the study, with each participants individually 
interviewed on their view of predefined risks followed by the same risks discussed within a facilitated group. 
 
The study first identified a list of the twenty most important risks according to the two departmental managers. From 
this initial identification of risks, four supervisors from each department ranked, from highest to lowest, all twenty risks 
as individuals. Following this stage, the consensus activities involved four supervisors from one department who ranked 
all twenty risks as a group and with the aim that all participants had to agree. Finally, the consensus activity was 
repeated with all eight participants present. Such a staged approach allowed the various approaches and resulting 
outcomes from the various risk assessment methods to be compared. Such a comparison found that there was a need to 
gain common understanding or clear definition of risks within the group, that an individual’s assessment of a risk was 
driven by their own perceptions and that less important risks held a more common view, whereas higher risk had a 
greater diversity of views. 
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INTRODUCTION 
AS/NZS4360:2004 suggests that the risk assessment process should not be conducted or information gathered in 
isolation. Further to this view, HB167:2006 states that “people who work in an organisation often have very important 
information about weakness” (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 13). Taking an insular method of data collection may lead 
to inaccurate risk assessment, as stakeholders with vested interest may emphasise their own risks or worst, game the 
risk assessment process. Previous studies (Beard & Brooks, 2006) have demonstrated how a consensual risk assessment 
approach may result in a more acceptable risk assessment outcome when compared to individual assessments; therefore, 
this study further examined how this approach can be applied in another security risk management situation. 
 
The field of risk management can be affected by small discrepancies in the information gathering process, resulting in 
significant impacts on the outcomes of a risk survey. To measure this affect, the research examined two methods of risk 
data collection in order to find the most appropriate approach. One method was individual interviews with the 
stakeholders. The second was a facilitated risk meeting with stakeholders to develop a consensus decision on risk. The 
method of data collection will be described and analysed, determining patterns and possible explanations. 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management provides a sensible approach to managing risk (Fischer & Green, 2004, p. 130) and a generic 
guideline is AS/NZS4360:2004 Risk Management. AS/NZS4360:2004 is often considered “almost a de facto global 
standard” (Jay, 2005, p.2) and has become an international template on dealing with risk, having been used in Canada, 
United Kingdom, and translated into Cantonese, Mandarin, Japanese, Korean, French and Spanish (Jay, 2005, p. 3). 
Most recently, AS/NZS4360 became the template for the International Standards Organisation ISO/FDIS 31000. Many 
industries use this framework and its applications are as broad as financial, engineering and security risk management 
(Jones & Smith, 2005a, p. 2). 
 
The standard’s definition of Risk is the likelihood of an event taking place that will have an impact upon the objectives 
of the organisation (Standards Australia, 2004, p. 4), combining likelihood and consequence in determining the amount 
of risk through a structured and logical approach. AS/NZS4360: 2004 Risk Management is the industry standard 
document for conducting risk projects and because of this, it formed the framework for the methodology of this study. 
Its flexibility and broad scope allowed the framework to be applied to the research of consensual risk analysis, as it is 
“widely used by security professionals and risk managers across Australia” (Jones & Smith, 2005b, p. 2). 
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The Australian Standard stages of the risk management process instruct that all relevant stakeholders need to be 
included in the process. According to the Standard, stakeholders are “those people and organisations who may affect, be 
affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by a decision, activity or risk” (Standards Australia, 2004, p.6). 
Further to this aspect is the need to take a “consultative team” approach (Standards Australia, 2004, p. 19); however, it 
can be argued that the standard does not present the necessity of providing a consensual assessment (Koller, 1999; 
Koller, 2000), with an appropriate methodology with a consensus based stakeholder meeting. 
 
The consensus methodology is supported by Koller (2000, p. 67), when he asserted that “maximum benefit from the 
risk processes is realized only when multiple opportunities are consistently assessed or compared”, with a salient aspect 
of consistency being the arrival of a consensus (Koller, 2000, p. 68). The consensus approach may be supported, in 
particular for security risk, by the assumption that there is generally limited historical data. Without a consensus 
assessment, risks are assessed in isolation. Such an insular method of data collection and assessment may lead to 
inaccurate risk management, as stakeholders with vested interests may emphasise their own risks or game the risk 
assessment process. Also, assessors may bias the assessment process based on an individuals beliefs, perceptions and 
experience (Brooks, 2005). 
 
CONSENSUAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
AS/NZS4360:2004 Risk Management states that all stakeholders need to be involved in the risk management process; 
however, it does not specify how although a consensual risk approach is one of the options available. A consensual 
approach to risk management would ensure that all risks are detailed and agreed upon by all stakeholders (Koller, 2000, 
p. 222). This approach involves a round table meeting with all stakeholders that needs to end in some degree of a 
consensual outcome. By using this model, issues such as individual risk perceptions can be minimised and their impact 
on the final risk assessment minimised. When conducting a consensus risk assessment, group dynamics will also have 
some role and an independent facilitator should conduct the activity, considered a group analysis or working group 
(Chapman, 1998). The methodology used by Beard and Brooks (2006, p. 8) into consensual security risk management 
has been modified to provide more valid outcomes and several stages added to build upon limitations of the original 
study. 
 
Whilst AS/NZS4360: 2004 Risk Management is an overarching risk framework, one area where it could be improved is 
with greater detail in respect to involvement of stakeholders and how this should be achieved (Standards Australia, 
2004, p. 11). This aspect is of concern because of people’s nature to adopt a parochial attitude towards their own vested 
interests. Heads of department will naturally try to skew risk assessments in their favour, ensuring budgets and 
structures remain or rise in their favour. This issue is of particular concern in the security industry, as risk gaming is a 
tool many security managers use in order to obtain approval from executive management for technologies they believe 
to be necessary and equivalent to the risk (Cubbage, 2005). 
 
If skewed, baised or partially incorrect information is gathered in the earlier stages of the risk management process, than 
results at its completion will be invalid. The consensus approach should eliminate or reduce such discrepancies early in 
the risk assessment process by ensuring all parties agree and that no opinion overrides another. Such an approach should 
transcend many varying motives by gaining an outcome that is beneficial to all involved in the assessment (Koller, 
2000, p. 228). Working group models have been successfully used to achieve an accurate and comprehensive risk 
management process and risk assessment in the construction industry (Chapman, 1998). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The area of risk and risk management has been widely documented in many industries as a way of making projects and 
facilities safer and more efficient. The application to the security industry allows for placement of resources into areas 
most needed. Security risk assessment and management is described as a method to identify the risks and the probable 
effects that they will have on the entity being protected to minimise that risk to an acceptable level (Fennelly, 2004, p. 
9). The field of risk management in security has slowly evolved over the last few decades (Standards Australia, 2006) 
and the methods used grown. 
 
AS/NZS4360 Risk Management standard presents a framework (Figure 1) on how risk managers could conduct an 
assessment,, being recognised throughout the world and used in many different languages (Jay, 2005, pp. 2-3). The 
standard provides a solid framework for the risk management process, beginning with Establish the Context, where the 
scope is set, and all stakeholders identified and involved. Next, the risks are Identified, Analysed and Evaluated and 
finally, risks are Treated. Concurrently with the risk assessment stages, the process is Monitored and Reviewed with 
stakeholders constantly Communicated and Consulted (Standards Australia, 2004). 
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Figure 1 Risk management 
(Standards Australia, 2004) 
 
The field of project management uses a large amount of risk assessment, and several methods of data collection that are 
poignant to both the security industry and this study. Kerzner (2003) stated that risks needs consideration in project 
management, along with costing and schedule. He favours several methods for achieving, this including: 
 Individual interviews with stakeholders 
 The Delphi method and 
 The Nominal Group Technique (Kerzner, 2003, p. 666) 
 
Individual interviews involve the facilitator gathering information from each stakeholder and then conducting the 
analysis and evaluation stages. The Delphi method firstly selects a panel of experts, consisting of decision-makers, staff 
and leading project staff (Turoff, 1970). Each expert makes an opinion on the chosen risk subjects, which is 
anonymously compiled by the facilitator. This feedback is redistributed to the panellists, who then make new opinions 
based upon the new information. The process is completed as often as is necessary to achieve the desired level of 
accuracy. 
 
The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was developed from social-psychological studies into decision-making in groups 
(Delbecq, 1968). The NGT is similar to the Delphi method; however, the participants have direct contact and all ideas 
are placed onto a flip chart without discussion. These ideas are discussed in the group and prioritised using a 
mathematical aggregate and repeated as often as necessary (Kerzner, 2003, p. 666). These approaches are used in the 
construction and project management industries; however, restricted research has been conducted into evaluating their 
effectiveness against the standard brainstorming technique proposed in risk management guidelines (Standards 
Australia, 2006) or their use in the specific security risk management field. 
 
A study conducted an analysis of brainstorming techniques, namely the Delphi method and NGT using the model of the 
determinates of group effectiveness (Chapman, 1998; Handy, 1983). Chapman stated that there are three distinct 
categories of risk data collection; identification solely by the facilitator, the facilitator interviewing stakeholders and the 
facilitator leading a working group. Using the model proposed by Handy, Chapman compiled a list of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the three types of working groups (1998). In general, the study found that generating a group of 
participants that would work well together was very low regardless of the technique used. The use of these techniques 
in project risk management are documented; however, studies into working group techniques within security risk 
management are restricted. 
 
One such study was considered by Beard and Brooks (2006) and their study into the use of a consensus approach in 
security risk management. Such a consensus approach involved gathering together all of the stakeholders in various 
departments of an organisation and working through the analysis and evaluation stages with the conclusion being a 
consensus, or all around agreement. By comparing this method with individual interviews and facilitator evaluation, it 
was found that a more rounded assessment could be gained with a consensus method. Otherwise participants tended to 
adopt a parochial attitude towards risk that affected or could be considered relevant to their own department (Beard & 
Brooks, 2006). This study used this approach to develop a methodology and analysis of a consensus approach. The 
overall goal was to create a set of identified and analysed risks, with relevant treatment options regarding security and 
liquor licence requirements. 
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STUDY DESIGN 
The design for the study (Figure 2) outlines the AS/NZS4360:2004 risk management framework (Figure 1) as the 
foundation for the study. Following this initial approach, the subsequent stage involved individual risk analysis for two 
distinct departments, with the final stage containing a consensus approach to risk analysis for Department 1 and both 
groups. 
 
The study applied the risk assessment process in a large entertainment complex, within the Security Department 
(Department 1), and Food and Beverage Department (Department 2). The scope for the risk assessment process and the 
identification of the most significant risks concentrated on risks that affected both departments concerning 
infringements under the Liquor Licensing Act and the possible loss of the complex license. Eight supervisors, four from 




Figure 2 Study design 
 
The study commenced with consultation with the site managers from both departments, with regard to the suitability 
and practicality of conducting the study. In addition, the scope for the identification and analysis of the risks was 
defined. In order to achieve a thorough research methodology, a pilot study was completed. This pilot study required a 
brainstorming session with the managers to create a list of ten risks. Using these 10 perceived risks, the managers 
individually listed the risks in order of highest to lowest (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000, p. 252). Again, using the 
10 perceived risks, the managers ordered the risks by working together and arriving at a consensus of the risks from the 
highest to lowest. The results and comments gathered from this activity were used to improve the methodology for the 
larger group activities. 
 
The first stage of the prime study was to identify the risks involved in the assessment, achieved with the assistance of 
the department managers (Standards Australia, 2004, p. 16). The managers brainstormed a list of twenty important risks 
that were to be assessed. These risks were listed on a survey form for the individual assessment activity and embedded 
into handout documents for the consensus activities. Following identification of risks, two methods of risk analysis 
were used and a comparison made. As individuals, four supervisors from Department 1 ranked all twenty risks from 
highest to lowest, repeated with four supervisors from Department 2. 
 
The consensus activities involved arranging a meeting with all four supervisors from Department 1 that took part as an 
individual activity and having them rank all twenty risks. This activity was completed with a consensual outcome, as all 
participants had to agree as near as was practicable. Again, the activity was repeated with all eight participants present, 
which took longer due to the wider differences of opinion in the larger number of participants. The final stage for this 
activity was to discuss treatment options for the top five ranked risks. 
 








Department 1 Department 2 
Individual Individual Consensus Consensus 
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ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the primary data (Table 1) presents the average results for both the department’s individual assessments, 













Risk A 9.5 16 14.75 8 17 
Risk B 11 12.75 13.25 1 2 
Risk C 4.75 5 5.5 4 1 
Risk D 10.75 9 9.875 11 14 
Risk E 5.5 7 6.25 12 11 
Risk F 15 11 13 15 8 
Risk G 9.25 4.5 6.875 6 9 
Risk H 4.25 4.25 4.25 5 4 
Risk I 17.25 17.75 17.5 17 20 
Risk J 8 7.5 7.75 13 12 
Risk K 13.25 9 11.125 16 13 
Risk L 13.25 14.5 13.875 9 15 
Risk M 5.25 4 4.625 2 5 
Risk N 10.75 9.75 10.25 14 6 
Risk O 5.25 11.5 8.375 3 3 
Risk P 14.25 15 14.625 19 16 
Risk Q 8.75 9 8.875 10 10 
Risk R 19.25 15 17.125 20 19 
Risk S 17.5 16.75 16.25 18 18 
Risk T 7.25 10.75 9 7 7 
 
Table 1 Risk comparison between departments 
 
In considering the differences between the collected data (Table 1), the views of the two departments are similar to 
some degrees. There is however same large variances when comparing the individual assessments to the two consensus 
assessments. When comparing the average individual security response to the security consensus, the results are 
relatively similar with some exceptions such as Risk E and Risk J. The combined consensus group results, when 
compared to the other results, demonstrate the most difference. Whilst most of the risks remain ranked in the same 
quartile, there was noticeable movement in the rankings. 
 
The average risk rankings from the Department 1 individual responses, the Department 2 individual responses and an 
all responses were calculated.  These results show that the individual risk rankings between the two departments did not 
vary as much as anticipated. Risk A and Risk O were the only risks with a significant discrepancy between the two 
departments. 
 
The standard deviation of each cohort were extracted (Table 2). The lower the value of the standard deviation in the 
combined individual results, the more aligned the individual assessments are. This demonstrates that risks such as Risk I 
and Risk K are ranked in the consensus, as all of the participants had similar individual rankings and the variance 
between the assessments was low (2.67; 3.31). Nevertheless, there were risks with higher standard deviation values, 
such as Risk D (6.62) and Risk B (6.99), with a lower degree of consensus in the group activities. The differences 
between the two department’s standard deviation values and the combined consensus values could indicate that there is 
differences in the departments with high values and that a particular risk, with a low standard deviation value, is 
considered equally by all members of the group. 
 
Risks Consensus Department1 Department2 All individuals 
Risk A 17 5.06 4.83 5.75 
Risk B 2 6.68 8.22 6.99 
Risk C 1 3.20 2.58 2.69 
Risk D 14 7.41 6.73 6.62 
Risk E 11 2.38 3.74 3.01 
Risk F 8 4.08 5.94 5.18 
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Risk G 9 2.36 3.10 3.60 
Risk H 4 2.87 2.62 2.54 
Risk I 20 1.25 3.86 2.67 
Risk J 12 5.35 5.68 5.11 
Risk K 13 1.50 3.36 3.31 
Risk L 15 7.32 1.00 4.88 
Risk M 5 3.50 3.55 3.33 
Risk N 6 5.37 3.20 4.13 
Risk O 3 3.59 5.80 5.57 
Risk P 16 3.86 1.82 2.82 
Risk Q 10 3.30 2.58 2.74 
Risk R 19 1.50 6.68 5.02 
Risk S 18 1.29 3.86 2.69 
Risk T 7 4.19 3.30 3.96 
 
Table 2 Risk standard deviation comparison between departments 
 
EVALUATION AND FINDINGS 
The results detailed above demonstrate that the aim of comparing and contrasting the individual and consensual 
approaches to security risk assessment were achieved. Such an outcome allows several important assumptions to be 
made, including the need to gain common understanding or clear definition of risk within the group, that individual’s 
assessment is driven by their own perceptions and that less important perceived risk held a more common view whereas 
higher risk had a greater diversity of views. 
 
First, in conducting an analysis of risk management and assessment methods, the pilot study and scope and 
identification stages indicated that the situation and risks must be clearly defined. In addition, that the risk scope 
carefully controlled in order to give appropriate results toward the risk assessment task. This study achieved this in two 
stages, which shaped the remainder of the methodology and activities. 
 
Second, the individual approach to risk analysis appeared to produce varying results in the risk rankings. Whilst this 
was expected, due to individual opinions, there were very few patterns in the differences in each department. Such 
limited differences infer that the participants did not adopt a parochial attitude towards the risks that affected their area 
the most. This appeared to contradict previous results, which purported that people skew risks to favour their interests 
(Beard & Brooks, 2006). Overall, the averages of the individual risk rankings did not vary greatly from the individual 
department average or combined individual averages. Such an outcome supports the argument that the participants from 
all departments viewed the majority of the risks with the same attitude and therefore, consensus results from both the 
individual and the combined rankings. 
 
Nevertheless, the consensus rankings are slightly different to the results found in the individual results, perhaps caused 
by the collaborative thinking and discussion of the risks. By using a group of people to discuss an issue, the result may 
broaden the participant’s perceptions and curb any extreme views on the subjects. The two consensus activities’ 
produced differing sets of results; however, the majority of risk movement was contained. Such a result may indicate 
that the two consensus groups were both regarding the risks with the same levels of concern, improving the accuracy of 
the combined consensus results. 
 
The standard deviation adds an interesting outcome to the findings. These figures indicated that if a risk had a low 
standard deviation value in the individual rankings, it therefore had a strong and accurate rating in the consensus 
rankings. Such an outcome could be expected when considering a common measure and therefore, risk view. It is of 
importance to note that the risks with the lower standard deviation values also had a lower risk ranking, often in the last 
five ranked risks. This result could highlight that there was little discrepancy amongst the participants with regard to 
those risks that was considered the least importance. Therefore, the risk that had a high ranking and a higher standard 
deviation was considered important by the participant. In addition, the discussion in the consensus groups was 
especially exhaustive for the rankings of these risks. The standard deviation process could prove to be useful to 
management of organisations conducting risk assessment, as a method of gauging accuracy and effectiveness of risk 
rankings. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There were several elements of the study that could have been improved. The methodology was solid and well 
structured; however, there were minor problems with application due to the organisational aspects of having eight 
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managers of a busy company attend the one meeting. The reliability and validity aspects could have been addressed 
more thoroughly throughout the study. One approach to address the problem of validity would be to a have a third 
group of participants conducting risk ranking and use this as a control group for comparison. To improve reliability, 
repeating the entire process at another organisation would provide another data set for comparison. Finally, a larger 
study that used the methodology presented in this study could be applied to a larger and more diverse group within or 




Security risk management is increasing used to direct limited resources in the mitigation of threat; however, risk 
management can result in these limited resources directed in an inappropriate or less effective manner. Risk 
management should include a number of discrete steps, with risk assessment embedded within these steps and 
incorporating risk identification, analysis and risk evaluation. It is at this assessment stage that many factors may result 
in the risk management process being less than effective, including individuals perceptions of risk, parochial attitudes, 
invested interests, undefined risks, bias or a limited understanding of a risk. To overcome these issues, some form of 
group consensus should be achieved. 
 
The article has presented a study that considered an approach that compared and contrasted individual and consensual 
approaches to security risk assessments. An organisation’s group managers from two related divisions assessed a 
number of predefined risk, where the results were analysed and interpretations made. The study found that there was a 
need to gain common understanding or clear definition of risks within the group, that individual’s assessment is driven 
by their own perceptions and that less important perceived risk held a more common view, whereas higher risk had a 
greater diversity of views. The study indicates that the use of different methods of risk assessment should consider the 
situation, using such approaches as group interviews, Delphi method and nominal group techniques. In addition, the 
results gathered from such group approaches can be used to ascertain accuracy and importantly, can confidently be used 
to allocate resources to minimise security threats. 
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Abstract 
Climate change and energy security are driving a worldwide renaissance in nuclear power. An Australian nuclear power 
industry has also been seriously investigated by the Australian government and its agencies. This paper provides a 
broad overview of the nuclear fuel cycle and the nuclear power industry. It identifies aspects that are sensitive to 
nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation to help security professionals identify threats and prepare for a 
possible Australian nuclear power industry. 
Keywords   
nuclear power, energy security, uranium, radiation 
INTRODUCTION    
It has been fairly widely accepted for decades in the scientific community that massive amounts of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emitted into the atmosphere by humans would increase the “greenhouse effect” resulting in global warming and 
other climate change. The most recent fourth assessment report of  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2007)  makes it clear that carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas affecting the 
Earth’s energy balance, with the primary source being the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). A global warming 
of 0.2˚C per decade is projected over the next two decades and rises of several degrees this century are expected if CO2 
emissions are not reduced.  
In Australia, over 96% of electricity generation (in terms of fuel inputs) is from coal, gas and oil (ABARE, 2009a). 
Hydroelectricity is our main “clean” electricity generation source which does not emit carbon dioxide. Although 
significant growth is likely in other “renewable” sources like wind generators, these are currently not suitable for base 
load power. Nuclear power plants can supply large amounts of base load power and do not emit greenhouse gases. With 
Australia’s natural wealth in uranium the nuclear option is being promoted, by some, as a “clean” source of base load 
power and an effective medium term action to reduce climate change. 
The year 2006 was pivotal in Australia with a nuclear power industry being seriously investigated through two 
comprehensive reports. The first report was commissioned by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 
Organisation (ANSTO) to look at the economics of nuclear power in the Australian context (Gittus, 2006). In the 
second half of the year, a taskforce was appointed by the Prime Minister to investigate and report on uranium mining, 
value-added processing, and the contribution of a nuclear energy industry in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2006). In summary, while high commercial and technology barriers could make Australian conversion, enrichment and 
fuel fabrication facilities difficult to build, there was support for an expansion of uranium mining, and nuclear power 
was considered economically feasible. The release in late 2006 of Al Gore’s academy award winning documentary film 
on climate change “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006), enhanced public perceptions of a crisis that is driving the debate on 
nuclear power in Australia.  
Despite having huge natural energy resources, Australia could find its energy security under threat from the 
international community that may not accept our huge carbon footprint. Australia has recently overtaken the United 
States of America as the world’s biggest emitter of CO2 per capita (Maplecroft, 2009), and globally enforced carbon 
emission caps may emerge as part of a global response to climate change. Australia may be forced to quickly reduce our 
reliance on fossil fuels or face sanction. 
This paper provides a broad overview of the nuclear power industry with the nuclear fuel cycle described in sufficient 
detail for security professionals to better appreciate security issues. Reference will be made to those aspects of most 
concern for nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. Regulation, safeguards and international experience 
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Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear fission power reactors. The front end of the 
nuclear reactor can be considered as two stages. Firstly, uranium ore is mined and processed to produce yellowcake 
(U3O8). This normally occurs at or near the mine site. Secondly, specialist facilities are needed to enrich uranium and 
produce fuel that a nuclear power station can use to produce electricity. Finally, the spent fuel is managed through 
storage, reprocessing and waste disposal.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of nuclear fission power reactor fuel cycle 
Uranium ore to yellowcake 
Australia has the world’s largest known recoverable uranium deposits (23%) in the world with major producers Canada 
and Kazakhstan account for about 60% of world supply of uranium for nuclear reactors from mines (World Nuclear 
Association, 2009). Natural uranium on Earth is radioactive and made up of 99.3% U-238 and just 0.7% U-235. Both 
U-238 and U-235 are alpha particle emitters with half lives of 4.5 billion years and 704 million years respectively 
(Thornton and Rex, 2006). The long half lives and dispersed nature of the uranium deposits make them not particularly 
radioactive. In the financial year 2007/2008, the three currently operating Australian mines at Ranger (NT), Olympic 
Dam (SA), and a small mine at Beverly (SA), produced a total of 10,101 tonnes of yellowcake (ABARE, 2009b). 
Yellowcake has a low specific radioactivity and is transported in 200 litre drums and loaded into shipping containers for 
enrichment overseas. World uranium mining will probably need to greatly expand in the coming decades due to an 
increasing number of nuclear power stations and a probable reduction in (currently 40%) nuclear fuel derived from 
decommissioned American and Russian nuclear warheads (ASNO, 2008) under the Treaty on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). 
Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication 
Through chemical reactions, yellowcake (U3O8) is converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) before the technologically 
challenging task of enriching the U-235 abundance from its natural 0.7% to between 3% and 5%. This is necessary for 
use in almost all nuclear power reactors as it is the U-235 isotope that is fissile and can therefore produce energy. 
Whilst other enrichment methods have been used in the past or are under development, the centrifuge method now 
dominates the international uranium enrichment industry. When uranium hexafluoride is fed into a swiftly rotating 
cylinder (centrifuge) there is a slight separation of the isotopes with the lighter 235UF6 having a slightly higher 
concentration near the axis and the heavier 238UF6 having a slightly higher concentration in the outer regions. By 
withdrawing uranium hexafluoride from near the axis and repeating the process through a series of centrifuges the 
uranium hexafluoride can be enriched to reactor grade. The centrifuge method requires about one tenth of the energy 
required in the diffusion method that was common up to the 1970s. Urenco have been building a national enrichment 
facility in New Mexico to supply the US market using state of the art centrifuge technology with first production 
expected towards the end of 2009 (Urenco, 2009). After enrichment, uranium hexafluoride is converted to uranium 
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Enrichment of the U-235 isotope to between 3% and 20% is referred to as low-enriched uranium. Greater than 20% is 
high-enriched uranium with more than 90% considered weapons grade. Commercial enrichment technology and 
expertise could be fairly easily adapted to produce weapons grade uranium for use in a nuclear weapons program. Much 
effort is therefore devoted to restricting this highly sensitive dual use technology as a critical step in preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
The usually unwanted U-235 deficient tails, known as depleted uranium, does have uses in other areas due to its 
chemical properties and high specific gravity of 18.7. It is found in counterweights (including keels of yachts) and in 
highly penetrating anti-tank ammunition. 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT 
Nuclear power plants 
The World Nuclear Association (2009, August) reported that there are 436 operating nuclear power plants worldwide 
generating 372 GW of electricity. The two most common reactor types are the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) and 
the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) with 260 and 92 plants respectively (Hore-Lacy, 2003). A succinct and up to date 
overview of current and proposed nuclear reactor types can be found in Norman, Worrall and Hesketh (2007). 
At the heart of nuclear power is the induced fission process that occurs in the reactor core. When U-235 absorbs a 
thermal (slow) neutron, the compound U-236 nucleus created quickly splits into two daughter nuclei and two or three 
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There are two important aspects to the nuclear fission reaction. Firstly the energy produced from U-235 fission is 
enormous and over a million times more than that produced by burning the same mass of coal. The daily requirements 
for a 1000MW power plant is about 3 kilograms of U-235 compared with about 8 million kilograms of coal (Thornton 
and Rex, 2006). Secondly, the fission produces neutrons that, when slowed down (moderated), may be absorbed by 
other U-235 nuclei to produce a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Details of how the nuclear reaction is controlled, 
neutrons moderated, and heat energy transferred away to electrical generators can be found in most university level 
physics textbooks including those by Thornton and Rex (2006), Serway and Jewett (2008), and Halliday, Resnick and 
Walker (2008).   
In addition to power reactors, there are over 250 research reactors in the world where the two primary functions are to 
produce high flux neutron beams for material science research and (through irradiation) manufacture 
radiopharmaceuticals for nuclear medicine. Some of these reactors use high-enriched uranium of up to 95% U-235, 
which unfortunately is also suitable for nuclear weapons. The new Australian research reactor, OPEL, uses low-
enriched uranium (just) of 20%, which improves security and nuclear safeguards (ANSTO, 2005). Research reactors 
typically require higher enrichment than reactors optimised for commercial power generation. In addition, there are 
breeder reactors (Thornton and Rex, 2006) where fast neutrons from U-235 fission are absorbed by U-238, which then 
beta decays to produce (breed) Plutonium (Pu-239) that is also fissile. Inherent problems with breeder reactors make 
them relatively uncommon. 
Spent fuel management: storage and reprocessing 
After 1-2 years, the used (or spent) nuclear fuel elements need to be removed from the reactor. Typically this used fuel 
is about 95% U-238, 1% Pu-239 (from transmutation of U-238 when a fast neutron is absorbed), 1% U-235, and 3% 
fission waste products (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). These waste products are highly radioactive and would be 
most dangerous if they were acquired by terrorists. Interim storage on site in large cooling ponds is required for several 
years to provide radiation protection, remove heat from further fission events, and (with the decay of short life 
radioactive isotopes) make the material easier to handle later. 
The spent fuel is either moved for reprocessing (after a few years of interim storage) or is left as waste until final waste 
storage facilities are ready. Although technologies for storing waste more permanently are being developed, the current 
thinking is to place suitably sealed waste in deep and stable geological repositories. Former Australian Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke has recently called on Australia to consider developing a nuclear waste industry that could be a source of 
income and contribute to energy security worldwide given geologically safe and remote storage options (The 
Australian, 2009). 
Reprocessing begins with the dissolving of spent fuel rods in acid to separate uranium and plutonium from the 3% 
waste products from the fission (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). These waste products are highly radioactive and 
require long term storage in drums. The uranium recovered can be recycled by going through the conversion and 
enrichment process again. It can also be used with the plutonium, which like uranium also produces energy through 
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neutron induced fission, to produce mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods. One of many safeguards in a reprocessing plant is to 
avoid storing separated plutonium by mixing in a 50/50 ratio with uranium (Pickett, 2008) 
 
SAFETY, NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
Nuclear weapons: U-235 or Pu-239? 
Plutonium has clear advantages over uranium for the construction and delivery of nuclear weapons. Firstly, Pu-239 can 
undergo induced fission more easily than U-235 as it captures both slow and fast neutrons. Secondly, the Pu-239 fission 
reaction also produces on average 2.7 neutrons per fission compare with 2.3 neutrons for U-235. A runaway chain 
reaction is therefore easier to create for Pu-239 which allows for the development of smaller nuclear warheads that can 
be more easily delivered by ballistic missiles where size and shape are critical. Pu-239 is an alpha emitter with a half 
life of 24 thousand years and is highly toxic. 
Pakistan and the Khan network 
The case of Pakistan and the Kahn network is illustrative of how easily technology and expertise can proliferate across 
international borders (Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, 2004). Back in the 1970’s, Pakistan began acquiring 
enrichment technology including the design details for advanced Zippe-type centrifuges (after German Scientist Gernot 
Zippe) from a European enrichment facility operated by Urenco. Pakistan was able to develop its own enrichment 
capability and successfully tested a nuclear fission bomb in 1998. It is believed that this technology, through the Abdul 
Khan network, was sold on the black market to Libya, North Korea and Iran. Although Libya has since renounced its 
nuclear program, North Korea announced its first successful nuclear fission bomb test on October 9, 2006, and Iran, 
despite UN sanctions (UN Security Council, 2008), is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities. Other Middle 
Eastern countries are also investigating the nuclear option. 
Regulation and safeguards 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 as an independent organisation within the 
United Nations (UN) to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The three main pillars of nuclear 
cooperation that underpin its mission are the promotion of safeguards and verification, safety and security, and science 
and technology. The IAEA has also responded to recent terrorist attacks through its coordination and strengthening of 
international approaches to promote nuclear security (IAEA, 2007).    
Diversion of nuclear material and technology in the nuclear power industry to nuclear weapons programs is and has 
been a major problem and concern of the international community. The 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Treaty (NPT) aimed to restrict nuclear weapons to the five nuclear powers at the time: USA, Soviet Union (now 
Russia), China, France and the United Kingdom. Since the NPT came into force in 1970, India, Pakistan and North 
Korea have conducted nuclear weapons tests, Israel is believed to be a nuclear power and Iran is believed to be close to 
becoming a nuclear power. India, Pakistan and Israel have never been signatories to the NPT. South Africa was a small 
nuclear power before deciding to voluntarily disarm and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus also briefly possessed 
nuclear weapons (Doyle, 2008). Given that much nuclear technology and expertise is common to the nuclear power 
industry and nuclear weapons programs, it has always been difficult for the IAEA, as the international body responsible, 
to inspect and verify solely peaceful intentions or operations. Additional protocols have been introduced to strengthen 
the non-proliferation safeguards in the NPT, but there was no general agreement to make these compulsory at the last 
five-yearly NPT review conference (NPT Review Conference, 2005). In September 2009 United States President 
Barack Obama chaired an historic summit of the security council which adopted resolution 1887 (2009) with 14 heads 
of state for broad progress on long-stalled efforts to staunch the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure reductions 
in existing weapons stockpiles, as well as control over fissile material (UN Security Council SC/9746, 2009).  
In Australia, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) within the Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is charged with ensuring that nuclear materials and items are used only for authorised 
purposes and that our international treaty commitments, including the NPT, are met. ASNO also reports to the IAEA 
and arranges site visits. Australia’s nuclear reactor at Lucas heights and three uranium mines with associated storage 
and transport operations are major responsibilities for ASNO. An Australian nuclear power industry would result in a 
huge increase in the storage and transport of radioactive materials. Further details of ASNO’s role can be obtained in 
the 2007-2008 Annual Report (ASNO, 2008). Note that health and safety relating to radiation is mostly regulated by the 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA, 2009).  
Proliferation and nuclear terrorism 
Access to enrichment technology and expertise is the biggest stumbling block in producing the highly enriched U-235 
required for a uranium bomb from uranium ore. Reprocessing technology of spent fuel rods from power reactors is 
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critical to extracting the Pu-239 required for the more versatile Plutonium bomb. It would seem logical that 
international and domestic concerns for the proliferation of nuclear weapons may limit the scope of an Australian 
nuclear power industry. However, a key finding of the second report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) is that 
increased Australian involvement in the fuel cycle would not change the proliferation risks or make Australia’s energy 
grid more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given international experience the author does not agree with this finding with 
respect to proliferation risks. 
A nuclear power industry would create additional sources of highly radioactive material that would need to be secured 
at nuclear facilities and in transportation between facilities around the country. This material could be diverted for use 
in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) to harm and terrorise a population. Natural disasters and accidental human 
intervention can also result in the dispersal of radioactive material (Swan, 2008). The ability to detect small amounts of 
radioactivity in a range of situations has become a bigger priority with increasing resources being allocated to tackle the 
problem. For example, in 2007 the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) announced 10 contracts worth US$8.8 million to perform exploratory research in advanced nuclear 
detection technology (DHS, 2007)  
The difficulties of ensuring that access to sensitive information, materials, technology and critical people are 
appropriately controlled would be a substantial and complex undertaking for security professionals. For example, major 
infrastructure, like nuclear power plants and enrichment facilities would require high level physical security and 
effective policies and procedures for materials and personnel. Transportation of sensitive/dangerous materials over large 
distances is an issue and the monitoring and guarding of highly radioactive waste in remote depositories would also 
need to be addressed.  
AN AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY? 
The British Prime Minister recently signalled that he would like Britain to play a major role in building an extra 1,000 
nuclear power stations around the world (The Independent, 2008). However, the change of federal government (from 
Coalition to Labour) in late 2007 has reduced the likelihood of Australia building nuclear power stations in the near 
future, although there is growing pressure within the ALP to more seriously revisit this option in response to climate 
change. In any case, the Australian uranium mining industry is preparing for rapid expansion and according to two 
recent comprehensive reports (Gittus, 2006 ; Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) nuclear power is a realistic option for 
Australia. 
The ANSTO report (Gittus, 2006) concludes that nuclear power is demonstrably the safest way of generating electricity 
and is an excellent source of supplies. It is reported that the fatality rate per unit of electricity is one thousand times as 
great for coal, oil and gas than it is for nuclear. It is estimated that although the risk of a terrorist attack on an Australian 
nuclear power station is 50% higher since 9-11, the risk is still very low. This paper seeks to broadly identify critical 
segments in the nuclear fuel cycle for terrorism and/or proliferation that have the potential to cause great harm. The 
overall security risks are significant and would need to be mitigated.  
Australia’s current role in the world nuclear power industry is that of a major miner of uranium ore and exporter of 
yellowcake. Australia has no conversion or enrichment capability, no fuel fabrication facility, no nuclear power stations 
and no reprocessing facilities. Our reactor expertise revolves around the scientific use of one small research reactor at 
Lucas Heights near Sydney. An Australian nuclear power industry would require a huge influx of technology, expertise, 
and radioactive materials which together would have far reaching and complex security implications. Adapting from 
international best practice where possible, there would be a need to develop expertise for the Australian context to 
provide security for whatever segment of the nuclear industry we chose to develop. Finally, nuclear power is one of 
many highly politicised issues in Australia and that some elements of the community may choose to inflate or deflate 
public perception of risks to suit their own purposes. 
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